America at the Crossroad: Energy, Environment, and National Security by Young, Russell M.
America at the Crossroads: 
Energy, Environment, and 
National Security 
Russell M. Young 
Trial Attorney 
Environment & Natural Resources Division 
U.S. Department of Justice1 
In the midst of the Persian Gulf War, George Bush repeatedly pro- 
claimed that "the 21st century will be 'the American Century."' But, he 
warned, to ensure that grand place in the "New World Order," the 
United States must fight to protect its access to cheap energy-in par- 
ticular, to the vast oil reserves of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
American voters now have sent Bush into early-retirement; but his 
successor, President Clinton, has empasized that he too supports the 
rationale of "Desert Storm" and would not shrink from committing U.S. 
forces to combat, were it necessary to protect our access to middle 
eastern oil supplies. Bush was the fifth successive president to link 
America's national security to petroleum supplies. For some twenty 
years, Republicans and Democrats alike have declared that America 
must achieve "energy independence." Yet today, far from being inde- 
pendent, the U.S. relies more than ever upon imported oil to satisfy its 
enormous appetite for energy. And now, more than ever before, it is 
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clear how far the United States will go to provide for its energy needs. 
As the Gulf War has made crystal-clear, the U.S. is entirely willing to 
shed "blood for oil." Thus, America's energy problem is the world's 
problem, and the world will feel acutely the consequences of this 
nation's energy policies. 
This paper will examine the background of America's continuing 
energy crisis, and the high-stakes struggle between powerful interest 
groups seeking to shape the nation's response to the crisis. The bitter 
debate between those opposing forces was recently highlighted by the 
"National Energy Strategy," a policy issued by the U.S. Department of 
Energy.2 The Strategy favored "free-enterprise"-i.e., private industries' 
production of oil and nuclear power-over energy conservation and the 
development of alternative energy sources. To increase oil production, 
the Strategy favored allowing oil companies to drill for oil in millions of 
acres of wilderness in public land, including an Alaskan wildlife pre- 
serve, and in areas offshore from California's pristine beaches. It also 
called for more nuclear plants, in an attempt to reverse the public's fear 
of an "American Chernobyl" catastrophe. Environmentalists, enraged at 
the Bush Administrations' proposals, waged the largest lobbying and 
public relations campaign in their history to prevent Congress from 
adopting the Strategy. As described below, the outcome of that public 
debate makes clear that the energy crisis is far from over. 
In reviewing the continuing energy debate, I will focus on the Na- 
tion's dependence on petroleum, and will suggest answers to three 
questions: (1) What solutions to the oil do proponents of free-enterprise 
champion, and who stands to profit? (2) What energy alternatives did the 
environmentalists put forward; and (3) Why do we have such an enor- 
mous appetite for oil-what is it about American culture that makes 
environmentalists' call for energy conservation seem so "un-Amer- 
ican?" Finally, a brief look to the future, to the likely consequences for 
the world of America's energy policy at the crossroads. 
2 U.S. Department of Energy, Feb. 1991. 
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I. Bast Geopolitical Crises And The United States' Response 
Ten days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Jimmy Carter said "[wle 
learned in 1973 that we could no longer depend on reliable supplies of 
cheap oil." The year 1979 repeated the lesson, he said, and the current 
crisis he called "the early stages of lesson number three."3 The "lesson" 
of 1973, of course, was the Arab oil embargo. For most of the twentieth 
century, U.S. production of petroleum led the world, and consumers 
came to rely upon relatively cheap oil. But U.S. oil production peaked in 
1970, at 9 million barrels per day, and then began to decline.4 By 1973, 
when Middle Eastern nations imposed their oil embargo, the U.S. con- 
sumed almost 16 million barrels of oil per day,5 and had come to 
depend on foreign oil for approximately 40% of its needs. 
In 1979, another crisis pinched America's oil umbilical cord. The 
Iranian revolution against the Shah, and America (the "Great Satan") cut 
oil imports. By then, the U.S. was consuming almost 19 million barrels 
per day.6 As the public fumed in long lines waiting for gasoline, Jimmy 
Carter launched several conservation efforts. Some were symbolic, such 
as his decree that government buildings employ temperature controls to 
reduce waste in heating and cooling. Carter himself wore a sweater 
around the White House that winter. But other programs were signifi- 
cant, such as the introduction of fuel economy standards for new auto- 
mobiles. Those standards, known as "corporate average fuel economy," 
or "CAFE," were first imposed in 1975, when the average American car 
got roughly 14 miles per gallon. The CAFE standards required car 
manufacturers to double that mileage by 1985.7 Finally, Carter launched 
a program to fund research and development in alternative energy fuels, 
3 Robert Bamberger, "Energy Policy", Congressional Research Service ("CRS"), 8 Feb. 1991, p. 2. 
4 At the same time, however, consumers did not have to pay more for shrinking supplies of domestic 
gasoline, because in 1971, then-President Nixon imposed wage-price controls which prevented oil prices from 
rising. Thus began a historic divergence between prices for U.S. oil, and more expeusive world oil. 
5 Daniel Yergin, "How To Design A 'New Energy Strategy,"' Newsweek, 11 Feb. 1991, p. 14. 
6 "International Energy Statistical Review," U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), p. 7-8 (26 March, 
1991). Compare the petroleum consumption in 1979 of Western European countries, e.g. the former West 
Germany (2,664,000 barrelslday); France (2,107,000 barrelslday); and Denmark (302,000 barrelslday). 
7 Robert Bamberger, "Automobile Fuel Economy Standards: Another Cup of CAFE?," CRS, 19 July, 1991, 
p. 2. 
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such as solar power, and battery-powered cars.8 By the early 1980s, one 
could see real results from these and other conservation programs. The 
U.S. reduced its oil consumption by 4 million barrels per day, and re- 
duced its dependence on foreign oil by 10%. In 1981, however, Ronald 
Reagan came to office. Promising to "get Government off the backs of 
the people," he virtually dismantled the energy programs of his prede- 
cessors. In its place, he called for energy independence through deregu- 
lation of, and more competition among the oil corporations. "The 
answer," he said, "to having all we need . . . is to turn the energy industry 
loose."9 
Among other things, Reagan cut funding for research and develop- 
ment of alternative energy, which fell from $856.9 million in 1979, to 
$84 million by 1990.10 Also, responding to the petitions of car manufac- 
turers, the Reagan Administration reduced the CAFE mileage require- 
ments for automobiles 4 times in 4 years.11 
Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan, who has always been known for his stu- 
pendous luck, escaped serious criticism because oil prices tumbled 
world-wide. By 1984, with cheap gasoline again filling America's gas 
tanks, and people abandoning their indoor sweaters, the Republican 
Party declared "[wle have left behind the days of gasoline lines, build- 
ing temperature controls ... and the cancellation of night baseball 
games.12 It was feel-good time in America again. Ronald Reagan was re- 
elected by a landslide. 
But slowly, and largely unreported by the media, energy trends again 
turned ominous. Spurred on by the collapse of oil prices, U.S. oil 
imports increased from 4.9 million barrels per day to over 8 million-a 
8 Carter also created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Over the past 10 years, the government has pumped 
over 580 milllon barrels of oil into underground salt caverns in Louisiana and Texas, to act as a 90-day 
emergency supply in the event of anolher crisis. "The Strategic Petroleum Reserve," CRS, (18 June, 1991), p. 
1. 
9 "Energy Policy," Democratic Policy Committee ("DPC"), U.S. Senate, 5 Feb. 1991, p. 2. 
10 See "Renewable Energy Technology," DPC, 15 Feb. 199, p. 9. Notably, in 1989, the U.S. spent only 
5.19% of its research and development budget on renewable energy research. By contrast, Denmark spent $9.37 
million on alternative energy research, which was 28.13% of its research and development budget. For example, 
Denmark spends roughly the same amount of money on wind power research as the U.S., which has a 
population 50 times larger. 
11 CAFE standards were reduced each year between 1986 and 1989 by the National Highway Safety 
Administration. Dwight Holing, "America's Energy Plan: Missing In Action," The Amicus Journal, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Winter, 1991, p. 20. 
12 "Energy Policy," DPC, p. 3. 
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63% rise. That growth alone was greater than all the oil consumed by 
Germany each day. Most of that rise replaced U.S. domestic oil produc- 
tion, which, since 1986, has fallen by almost 2 million barrels per day, to 
7.2 million barrels.13 And, in absolute terms, the United States now 
imports more oil than Germany and Japan combined.14 
11. Lesson Number Three: The Present Crisis 
The U.S. enters the mid-1990s with the oil market displaying trends dis- 
turbingly similar to those of the 1970s. Growing demand for oil, accom- 
panied by a decrease in domestic production, has resulted in a rapidly 
growing dependence on imported oil, particularly on Middle Eastern oil. 
Currently, the U.S. imports nearly one-half of its oil, representing one- 
third of its enormous national trade deficit. 
At the same time, new American cars actually are growing less 
energy-efficient. In the past 3 years, the average fuel efficiency has 
declined by 4%, according to the government. This is not surprising 
because, adjusting for inflation, gasoline now costs only a bit more than 
one-half what it did a decade ago, and less than it did in the 1950s. Also 
we now see the return of the "land yachts": Americans are buying 
larger, heavier highway cruisers, with more horsepower.15 
In the midst of the Persian Gulf War, George Bush's administration 
was busy preparing yet another official remedy to America's energy 
crises-the National Energy Strategy. Eighteen months in the making, 
the Strategy had been highly anticipated, as it aimed to provide a 
framework for energy policy into the 21st century. But when it was 
revealed to the public in 1991 by the Department of Energy, it only 
ignited more bitter debate. 
13 See "Energy Policy," DPC. As recently as 1990, the world's largest oil producer was the then-Soviet 
Union, which produced 11,172,000 barrelslday. The United States is the second largest producer, but if current 
trends continue, the U.S. may soon be surpassed by Saudi Arabia, which produced 6,287,000 barrelslday in 
1990. 
14 Daniel Yergin, "How To Design A 'New Energy Strategy,"' Newsweek, 11 Feb. 1991, p. 14. 
15 "Why Fuel Efficiency Is Conking Out On The Hill," Business Week, 3 June, 1991, pp. 26-27. Since 
1988, the average weight of new American cars has risen 6%, while horsepower jumped 10%. 
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The central premise of the Strategy was itself a radical departure from 
20 years of national policy, For the first time, the Strategy declared that 
there was "no feasible combination of domestic or international energy 
policy options" that would make the nation independent of imported oil, 
or isolated from future oil supply disruptions, without "imposing crip- 
pling and unacceptable burdens upon the economy."l6 
Nevertheless, the Strategy advocated policies to make the U.S. less 
vulnerable to "economic damage from the violent fluctuations" in 
petroleum supplies and prices.17 Three such policies stood out. First, 
Bush, like Reagan, was committed to the "power of the marketplace"-- 
i.e. competition among oil companies, to determine the price and mix of 
fuels, as well as the choice of technologies to achieve energy effi- 
ciency.18 The Strategy rejected any attempt to use government regula- 
tion and tax incentives to influence the market, or to narrow consumer 
choices. Second, Bush called for boosting production of domestic oil by 
allowing oil companies to drill in a vast Alaskan wilderness, called the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, as well as in areas offshore of California 
and other states. This was not private property the Strategy was talking 
about. It was public land, owned by the U.S. government, not the oil 
companies. Yet, the Strategy proposed to allow the oil companies to drill 
in some 600,000 acres of the land, because the government estimated 
there are 6.1 billion barrels of petroleum there. Finally, under Bush's 
Strategy, rather than increase car fuel efficiency standards, the govern- 
ment would agree only to study whether any increase is necessary. 
Predictably, the National Energy Strategy was greeted with a storm of 
protest. Environmental activists and many Democrats in Congress 
blasted the White House for focusing on oil production at the expense 
of energy conservation. Environmental groups called for an "immediate 
national response to expose the Administration's [Strategy as] a sell-out 
to America's oil, gas and nuclear industries ... a death-knell for the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge . . . and the virtual abandonment of 
energy conservation as a national goal."l9 Similarly, then-Senator A1 
Gore, remarked that "where the National Energy Strategy is concerned, 
the Bush Administration is like an alcoholic trying to stop drinking. For 
16 "National Energy Strategy," U.S. Department of Energy, p. 3. 
17 "National Energy Strategy: Executive Summary," p. 2. 
18 "Bush Asserts Need For Foreign oil," New York Times (NYT),  21. Feb. 1991, Dl-D2. 
19 Mail solicitation for support by the Natural Resources Defense Council, May, 1991. 
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18 months, he keeps drinking but he examines every alternative, and 
weighs every option. At the end of 18 months, still addicted, he has a 
startling breakthrough: the real problem isn't that he can't quit drinking, 
it's that he can't get enough to drink." 
In the months that followed, environmentalists focused their attacks 
on the Strategy's proposal to drill for oil in the Arctic wildlife refuge and 
offshore areas. They conceded that there may be as much as 6.1 billion 
barrels of oil there. But they cited the U.S. Geologic Survey, which 
determined that even if all the protected lands were opened, drilled and 
drained, they would yield only about one year's supply of oil, based on 
current rates of consumption. Thus, one environmental group argued, 
"[tlhe drilling strategy offers at best a temporary dribble of oil . . . helping 
to prolong an addiction that ultimately can be sustained only through 
steadily increasing Persian Gulf imports."2o As an alternative to such 
production-oriented policies, environmentalists urge energy conserva- 
tion and efficiency. As an example, they point to the transportation sec- 
tor, which is responsible for some 60% of U.S. oil consumption.21 They 
claim that by increasing fuel efficiency of U.S. cars by 1.5 miles per 
gallon each year, over 7 years, the nation could save the equivalent 
amount of oil produced by Kuwait and Iraq before the war, combined.22 
The attacks by environmentalists finally produced some victories. 
Energy legislation, passed in late-1992, made it possible to crush advo- 
cates of oil drilling in the Alaskan wilderness, and to limit drilling in off- 
shore areas. The Bush Administration was forced to abandon its goal of 
finding new oil fields in America's public parks and waters. In other 
areas of the legislation, however, Bush was more successful in protect- 
ing the interests of car manufacturers and oil companies by defeating all 
efforts to require automobile makers to build more fuel efficient cars. 
The energy bill also rejected efforts to have oil companies pay for an 
increase in the amount of oil stored in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a 
result which so delighted the then-Energy Secretary Watkins that he 
labeled it "a major victory for President Bush's leadership" in energy 
policy. 
20 "America's Energy Plan: Missing In Achon," The Amtcus Journal, Natural Resources Defense Council, p. 
16. 
21 Ibid., p. 18. 
22 Ibid. 
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The latest battle between conservationists and "free-market" policies 
will be over. But, as many commentators note, Congress has compro- 
mised away any serious effort to reduce America's dependence on oil. 
Thus, the Clinton Administration inherits the same policy morass that 
bogged down his predecessors. Massive consumption of Middle Eastern 
oil will remain America's status quo-at least until the next Persian Gulf 
upheaval. 
111. Why Do We Not Change? 
"Breathtakingly dumb" is what one critic called the Bush Strategy, for 
"under this plan our consumption of imported oil will increase dramati- 
cally even as our soldiers are engaged in combat in the Persian Gulf."23 
For the present, at least, "Desert Storm" is over. But with America still in 
the throes of its third oil crisis, it is fair to ask Americans why they do 
not change their ways, and cut back on driving cars, for example, to 
conserve oil. There are many reasons, but I will focus on three major 
ones here. 
A. Special Interests 
The political and economic influence of automobile and oil corpora- 
tions, is, of course, enormous. Detroit and Big oil are the two largest 
corporate powers in America today, and they have wielded their power 
effectively in Congress. Even conservative business magazines reported 
recently that it was the "campaign" by those industries in Congress 
which defeated efforts to require Detroit to build more fuel efficient cars. 
Corporate greed was also a factor in the plan to open up more of Alaska 
for drilling. The stakes are high: oil companies made over $40 billion in 
profits from oil production in other parts of Alaska between 1969 and 
1987, and now they want more.24 
23 A1 Gore, as quoted In "Bush Asserts Need For Foreign 011," NYT, 21. Feb. 1991, Dl-D2 
24 "America's Energy Plan: Missing In Action," The Amicus Journal, p. 17. 
100 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 25, 1993 
B. The Practical And Technical Difficulties 
Europeans often ask why the United States does not solve the oil con- 
sumption problem by raising the cost of gasoline, as in Europe.25 There 
are several standard responses by opponents of more expensive gaso- 
line, some of which are certainly legitimate. First, opponents point out 
the central role that cheap energy, along with advancing technology, has 
played in increasing the productivity and prosperity of U.S. society in 
the 20th century. In effect, this argument casts the price of gas as a vir- 
tual index of democratic-capitalist viability. 
Then, there are problems over how to distribute the economic shock 
of higher prices, especially now, during a recession. A tax on gasoline at 
the pump would be "regressive," hitting the poor the hardest, especially 
the rural poor. And a tax on imported oil would reduce demand for 
imported oil, but it would not affect the underlying forces which cause 
the growth in oil demand. 
Despite such arguments against increased energy prices, the Clinton 
Administration new is signaling that it may seek to impose "some kind 
of energy tax" in an effort to reduce both energy consumption and the 
immense federal budget deficit.26 Such a move is necessary and long 
overdue. However, it will require political courage. During the presiden- 
tial campaign, Clinton opposed raising taxes on gasoline, a position that 
helped him to win over many middle-class voters. For the new 
Administration now to call for higher gasoline taxes would inevitably 
fuel renewed Republican attacks on Clinton's credibility. And, to make 
matters worse, a virtual army of coalition groups reportedly has been 
"propel[ed] to the barricades" by the mere suggestion of any kind of 
energy tax hikes. Their strident opposition to any change in the energy 
price status quo ensures that Clinton will have a major fight on his 
hands.27 
25 Compare gasoline retail prices per gallon in February, 1990. U.S: $1.20-.30; France: $4.47; Italy: $5.26; 
Germany: $3.48. American retail gas costs less because tax on U.S. gas is 10% the average tax in major 
Western European countries. "How To Design a 'New Energy Strategy,"' Newsweek, p. 43. 
26 "Engergy Tax Suggestions Propel Opponents to the Barricades," Washington Post, 5 February, 1993, p. 
A-23. 
27 The coalition opposing energy tax increases includes a broad and sometimes comical variety of industries 
which share a single vested interest-preserving cheap ttansportation. For example, one coalition member, the 
Transportation Advisory Council, represents 30 other trade associations, including the American Bus 
Association, the Asphalt Institute, the National Ready-Mixed Concrete Association, the American Public 
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C. The Car Culture 
There is a third, and far more deeply rooted reason for America's evi- 
dent paralysis-one that has to do with America's love affair with the 
car. In no other nation are there so many automobiles per capita, and in 
no other nation is the auto perceived to be so important to individual 
and national life. As one observer put it, the car has "created the modem 
American landscape and the physical patters of urban and suburban life. 
It has shaped the economies of almost all Americans as well as the 
economy of the nation." Yet, to blame the gas-gulping car is to beg the 
question of why-why has the automobile assumed such a vital role in 
American life? Part of the answer can be found in America's peculiar 
history as a New World frontier. As the historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner pointed out, long after the actual frontier receded, it has remained 
as a metaphor, as a national myth of origin which continues to shape 
our culture and character as a people. I will touch here on three aspects 
of our frontier heritage, those of the Wilderness, Individualism, and 
Mobility, to show how they are largely responsible for the American car 
culture, and our seeming inability to change it. 
Since its birth, the American nation has embraced the dream of 
expansion into the Wilderness, and that dream is crucial to Americans' 
sense of their special place in the Universe. Those who came to the New 
World felt themselves to be a Chosen People, whose special blessing 
and burden it was to break forever with the corrupt past, and become the 
vanguard of the Creator's new plan for humanity. And those who sur- 
vived on the frontier developed an exhilarating sense of mastery, of 
purity and renewal that has everything to do with Americans' sense of 
destiny and mission to reform the world.28 Today the Wilderness 
remains a symbol of, and provides the setting for, an unconscious ritual 
for the American mission to expand and conquer New Worlds (and to 
establish New World Orders). Thus, many Americans have the sense 
that they are "on the cutting edge of history, path finding, discovering 
and settling the chaotic Wilderness which is just beyond-over the next 
Transit Association, American Builders and Contractors, the American Petroleum Institute and the Association 
of American Railroads. 
28 As Frederick Jackson Turner expressed it in his 1893 essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," "[tlhis perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new 
opportunities ... furnish the forces dominating American character." As cited in James Oliver Robertson, 
American Myth, American Reality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), p. 192. 
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hill, across the desert, over the next ocean, on the next satellite or 
planet."29 
Although in the myth, Americans share a collective destiny to tame 
New Worlds, the "real American" does so as an individual. Our Wilder- 
ness heritage provided the role models for individualism-the back- 
woodsman Deerslayer, the pioneer, the cowboy and other archetypes of 
rugged individualism. Such role models, while exhausted now to the 
point of campiness and clich6, still permeate American culture, rein- 
forcing one of the culture's central articles of faith: that individual 
freedom, and the individual pursuit of happiness, are the inalienable 
rights of Americans. It is an American tenet of faith that there can be no 
freedom and pursuit of happiness without mobility, and so Americans 
are seemingly forever on the move. As one historian has explained, 
Americans identify physical mobility so closely with social mobility that 
the two often are indistinguishable: 
Movement is the magic which keeps expectations high in America. From the movement of 
the first colonists to the New World, through the westward movement of Americans, to the 
movement of people into cities, movement itself has been the continuing proof-to 
Americans-of [the] social and economic mobility . . . of the individual. Movement fuels the 
belief in unlimited opportunity and ultimate success ... . It is  the symbol of progress, of 
independence and of individual freedom all  wrapped up in one.30 
Of course, many Americans actually lead very sedentary lives, with little 
apparent possibility of either social or geographic mobility. However, 
that reality is less important than the fact that Americans for the most 
part believe that they are mobile. 
Today, Americans by the millions satisfy their restless need to move, 
and to believe in their social mobility, by driving their cars. The auto- 
mobile has become the quintessential way for Americans to express 
their individuality, their pursuit of happiness. By moving under his or 
her own control in a car, an American demonstrates power and inde- 
pendence. And if the car is very expensive, that sends the unmistakable 
signal that the "pursuit of happiness" has resulted in economic success. 
In fact, "it is almost impossible for Americans today to conceive of 
individual freedom . . . or happiness, without some means of motor driven 
transportation.. . . The sign for many contemporary American adolescents 
29 Ibid., p. 122. 
30 Ibid., pp. 242-243 
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of their independence and adulthood is their own 'wheels,' and a pow- 
erful rite of passage into adulthood is the driving test required for a 
driver's license."31 Thus, Americans who do not own a car, either 
because it is too expensive, or it is inconvenient in the city, often are 
perceived of as deficient, or even somewhat suspect. The car also allows 
Americans to play out in symbolic form the historical pageant of west- 
ward expansion into the Wilderness. With a car, or, even better, a motor- 
cycle, an American can be a loner, in motion, exploring new land, and, if 
he wishes, defying the speed limits of authority. 
Hollywood long ago recognized the powerful attraction of such sym- 
bolism, as shown in the movie genre of "Road Films," such as the 
"Wild One," "Easy Rider," "Vanishing Point," and, most recently, a 
spectacularly successful film of women on the road called "Thelma and 
Louise." In each, loners strike out across the land in cars or cycles, defy- 
ing authority along a journey with no real destination except, perhaps, 
self discovery and death. 
Nor is the exploration theme lost on automobile advertisers. Car 
commercials routinely display the latest models cruising alone (with no 
driver visible), through the vast landscapes of the American West. Even 
the names of our cars reflect the themes of individualism, social mobility 
and expansion into the Wilderness. To celebrate the theme of New 
World immigration, we have our "Plymouth" brand automobiles, while 
the "Pontiac" embodies the now-extinct tribe of native Americans who 
greeted the first settlers in what is now Virginia. To evoke images of the 
18th century colonial elite, the landed gentleman, we have our "Country 
Squire" station wagon. Our Wild West lives on in the form of the Jeep 
"Comanche," the Ford "Mustang," the Ford "Bronco," and the Dodge 
"Colt." To stimulate our already hyper wanderlust, Detroit launched the 
"Eagle," the "Scout," the "Conquest," the "Rambler," the Dodge 
"Caravan," the "Plymouth Voyager," the Lincoln "Continental," and 
the "TransAM." And, lastly, car makers blast off to the new frontier in 
space, with the "Galaxy 500" the "Nova," the "Saturn," and that 
quintessence, the Nissan "Infinity." 
31 Ibid., p. 192. 
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IV. The Future 
Of course, to fuel all this frenzy for mobility, individualism and expan- 
sion, the car culture needs huge supplies of gasoline, which brings us 
back to our present crisis, and the question of our collective future. Our 
past energy policies have been dismal failures. America faces some hard 
choices, and the direction it takes undoubtedly will affect the world. 
One option is to continue consumption at the present levels. After all, 
at this rate, the Earth's proven oil reserves could last 100 years or 
more.32 Yet the status quo poses huge problems. First, even at current oil 
prices, America cannot continue indefinitely to borrow billions of dollars 
to pay for imported oil, without suffering an ever more swift econon~ic 
and social decline. And many analysts believe that oil prices soon will 
rise.33 Also, by continuing to rely on oil from the Middle East, one of the 
world's most troubled regions, we invite more petroleum wars. Like all 
world powers, if necessary, America is prepared to take great risks, and 
to compromise its ideals, to protect the country's "vital national inter- 
ests"-that is-to get what it thinks it needs. As one environmentalist 
group warned during the Gulf War, "[mlake no mistake about it. 
Someday, even after the current crisis is 'resolved,' [the government] 
will commit [our flesh and blood] again, and then again after that- 
unless and until we change the terms of the debate."34 
A third problem is the possible destruction of the environment. In 
America, if we insist on drilling in national parks, for example, we 
threaten the very Wilderness so vital to Americans' sense of identity. 
And in terms of the Earth itself, global warming looms ever larger as a 
real threat. Carbon dioxide, much of which is produced by automobiles, 
appears to be the culprit, yet the United States, which spews approxi- 
mately 23% of the carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year,35 has 
blocked efforts by the European Community and the United Nations to 
reach agreed-upon limits of such emissions. On that issue, only Saudi 
Arabia and the former Soviet Union have stood with the United States.36 
32 "Energy Policy," CRS, citing International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1990), p. 3. 
33 Kenneth Sheets and Kevin Chappell, "A Bumpy Ride For Oil," U.S. New & World Report, August 5, 
1991, p. 30. 
34 "Positive Energy," Sierra Club Magazine, MarchiApril 1991, p. 38.. 
35 The Times, 12 July, 1991. 
36 The U.N. Conference on the Environment in Rio de Janeiro, America's isolation on this and other global 
environmental issues became even more painfully clear. 
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Meanwhile, catastrophes such as the Gulf War exacerbate the problem. 
Environmentalists believe that each day the oil well fires burned in 
Kuwait, the pumped into the atmosphere as much carbon dioxide as 
produced each day by France.37 
Another option is to reduce oil consumption by raising prices. Yet, 
given our car culture, oil prices would have to go very high indeed to 
force Americans off the road and into mass transit. That could wreak 
economic havoc, and, as always, the poor would suffer most. Outside of 
our major cities, mass transit just does not exist. We have trapped 
ourselves into car dependence by creating a landscape of suburbias, 
exurbias and shopping centers which are hours away from the towns 
and cities to which most people still must drive to work. Then there is 
the political problem. As any politician of dull-normal range intelligence 
knows, Americans are not about to change their car culture, with its 
deep psychic and social roots, without a fight. 
A final option: America could look to science to cure its energy ills. 
We could invest in alternative energy sources with all the passion and 
expertise the country devoted to the Gulf War. Yet Big Oil and Detroit 
oppose any reduction in oil production. And even the most optimistic 
environmentalists concede there is no grand technological "fix" visible 
on the horizon. Rather, renewable fuels such as solar power offer only 
partial solutions, and probably not really significant ones over the next 
decade. In the meantime, we could burn more coal, but that increases 
acid rain. We could follow the National Energy Strategy and turn more 
to nuclear power, as has France. But going "nuke" raises the specter of 
Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl, to say nothing of the problem of dis- 
posing of waste which will remain radioactive for the next 10,000 years. 
Global warming, acid rain, economic decline, Chernobyl, petroleum 
&ars, wilderness destruction . . . has America finally reached the Pacific? 
the end of the Road? I do not pretend to know, and so I will close here 
with the words of that eminent philosopher, Woody Allen. Imparting his 
wisdom to a class of graduating college students, he said "[mlore than 
at any other time in our history, mankind faces a crossroads: one path 
leads to despair and utter hopelessness; the other to extinction. Let us 
pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." 
37 ChW television, as reported by Greenwire News Service, July 30, 1991. 
